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Abstract
In this paper, we briefly present the objectives of Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT) and the formal structure which is proposed for
dialogues. Then, we introduce our development corpus, and a computational model designed for the identification of discourse minimal
units in the context of argumentation and the illocutionary force associated with each unit. We show the categories of resources which
are needed and how they can be reused in different contexts.
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1. Introduction
Illocutionary structure and argumentation in real language
is intricate and complex, and nowhere more so than in de-
bates. Identifying this structure without any theoretical
scaffolding is extremely challenging even for humans. New
work in Inference Anchoring Theory, IAT (Budzynska and
Reed, 2011) has provided significant advances in such scaf-
folding which are helping to allow the analytical challenges
to be tackled. This paper shows how these advances can be
used to develop an NLP approach designed to understand
the structure of natural debate, in particular from an argu-
mentation and persuasion point of view.
In this paper, we briefly present the objectives of IAT and
the formal structure which is proposed for dialogues. Then,
we introduce our development corpus, and a computational
model designed for the identification of discourse minimal
units in the context of argumentation and the illocutionary
force associated with each unit. We show the categories of
resources which are needed and how they can be reused in
different contexts.
2. An Introduction to Inference Anchoring
Theory (IAT)
In IAT (Budzynska and Reed, 2011) (and cf. (Reed et
al., 2010)), different relations between propositions usu-
ally distinguished by logic and argumentation theory can
be expressed. For example, modus ponens or argumenta-
tion schemes such as argument from consequences (Walton
et al., 2008) are frequently encountered. Propositions may
also be connected through other types of relations such as
challenge or conflict, when one is the negation or some op-
position of another.
The organization and the logical links between dialogi-
cal utterances are governed by dialogue rules which ex-
press how sequences of utterances can be composed (these
steps are called transitions). For example, the disputants
follow a dialogical rule stipulating that challenging is al-
lowed after asserting. Such a normative view of dialogue
structure is quite common e.g. in philosophy, authors
such as Mackenzie (Mackenzie, 1990) have explored dia-
logue rationality in these terms in a thread of work rooted
in Wittgenstein, whilst in linguistics, approaches founded
upon discourse analysis such as Dialogue Macrogame The-
ory (Mann, 2002) and the HCRC dialogue coding (Carletta,
1997) aim to account for dialogue coherence. Characteriz-
ing the application of dialogue rules specifically as transi-
tions between locutions is rather unusual, but is a central
part of IAT, because these transitions can act as “anchors”.
Understanding the ways in which dialogical action can es-
tablish arguments and inferences stands at the intersection
of many disciplines including (at least), discourse analysis,
pragmatics and semantics.1 It is unsurprising that within
each of these fields there are approaches to which IAT can
be compared. In discourse analysis, Rhetorical Structure
Theory, RST (Mann and Thompson, 1988) has been enor-
mously influential in facilitating computational models of
discourse structure. It postulates a number of discourse re-
lations that can account for the overall structure of any kind
of text (a logical analysis of RST is given in (Fiedler and
Horacek, 2007)). Within our framework, RST can be used
to represent the structure of arguments (a conclusion be-
ing a nucleus and a support its satellite), and, to a larger
extent, to represent the structure of explanations, clarifi-
cations, reformulations, elaborations, illustrations, condi-
tionals, causes, etc. From that point of view RST offers a
useful means to represent the linguistic structure of a dia-
logue. RST does not, however, capture inferential patterns,
which lie at the very heart of IAT. It is also not sufficient
at handling more fine-grained argument structures for at
least two reasons (Reed, 1998; Peldszus and Stede, to ap-
1This disciplinary distinction is inevitable rather artificial: it
aims to indicate broadly some of the scholarly perspectives on the
issue.
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pear): first, many argumentative relations seem to be quite
orthogonal to rhetorical relations – whether two sentences
are related through Elaboration or Justification says little
or nothing about whether they form a part of a Modus Po-
nens or Modus Tollens, or a part of linked or convergent
argument structure; and second, argument structure is often
missed entirely by rhetorical structure, a problem which be-
comes manifest in the abundance of (vapid) JOINT relations
in RST analyses of many arguments.
In pragmatics, one of the most significant approaches to
dialogue meaning has come from DRT and particularly a
more recent derivative, Segmented Discourse Representa-
tion Theory, SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003). Where
Inference Anchoring Theory focuses specifically on argu-
mentative discourse, SDRT has much broader goals than
IAT and, as a result, is less well adapted at handling the
structure of inference-establishing discourse units. In par-
ticular, because SDRT defines all locutions as actions per-
formed in the context of the entire history of the dialogue up
to that point rather than on the functional relationship, it is
impossible to single out that part of the history with which
inference is being established. This loss of the functional
relationship makes it impossible to recover the underlying
inferential structure.
In semantics, Ginzburg (Ginzburg, 2012) has had a major
impact on our understanding of the meaning of dialogical
actions. The KoS approach, like SDRT, is much more gen-
eral than IAT, but, also like SDRT, suffers in its ability to
handle argumentation as a result. Specifically, KoS does not
allow the establishment of a relation between propositions
(such as inference) to be the result of a pair of locutions
which together establish an illocutionary force, such as ar-
guing. Without such pairing, understanding how challenge-
response sequences establish inferences is precluded.
There are several other annotation schemes used specifi-
cally for corpus analysis of different dialogical structures.
Probably the most comprehensive set of annotations orig-
inates from the switchboard dialog act, SwDA (Stolcke et
al., 2000). This set of annotations was constructed from a
large set of types of dialogues and is now widely used in
the dialogue community. This rich tagset offers over 200
different tags (of which 60 are basic) that account for the
various forms of exchanges found in dialogues, as found
e.g. in help desks. There are however no specific tags that
can directly account for argumentation attitudes and it does
not allow for expressing different propositional or psycho-
logical attitudes, and belief expressions important from a
point of view of argument recognition.
In this work, logical structures are said to be “anchored” in
dialogical structures via illocutionary connections related
to different illocutionary forces (i.e. the speakers commu-
nicative intentions (Searle, 1969)). This approach offers a
significantly more fine-grained account of the context of a
dialogue in which a logical inference is established, than
is available in, for example, SDRT (Asher and Lascarides,
2003), whilst offering an illocutionary account of structure
rather than a rhetorical account (Moeschler, 2002; Hernault
et al., 2010), they provide a much better account of argu-
ment and debate. By analogy, work on rhetorical structure
parsing (Stede, 2012; Marcu, 1997; Marcu, 2000) can be
a mechanism for illocutionary structure parsing. Finally,
the SwDA initiative has introduced a number of annota-
tions and resources for dialogue analysis which are now
widely used. Our approach is a kind of complement to
SwDA: it is more oriented towards argumentation analysis,
it is more likely to emphasize the nuances between illocu-
tionary forces and to propose an accurate identification of
the dialogical argument structure (with more details on dis-
course regulators, questions, challenges, etc.).
In order to be able to identify arguments and make explicit
the logical structures that are involved in a dialogue, we
first need to identify the illocutions of the dialogical moves
involved (such as assertions and challenge). Our initial cor-
pus (cf. (Reed et al., 2008)is the BBC Radio 4 programme
The Moral Maze, which is explicitly structured around a
debate format. The MM2012 corpus1 comprises 65,000
words of transcript, and includes the following example in
which disputants are discussing whether the British Empire
behaved in an uncivilized way during a war in Kenya in the
1950s:
(1) a. Lawrence James (LA): It was a ghastly aber-
ration.
b. Clifford Longley (CL): Or was it in fact typ-
ical? Was it the product of a policy that was
unsustainable that could only be pursued by
increasing repression?
Intuitively, what Longley claims in (1-b) is that uncivilized
behavior was typical for the Empire, and he supports this
claim with a premise that such behavior was the product of
an unsustainable policy. On the linguistic surface, however,
not only do we have neither conclusion nor premise explic-
itly asserted, but the act (1-b) is cast as a series of questions.
IAT introduces a formalism and a notation for modeling di-
alogues composed of three main elements (Budzynska et
al., 2013)):
• Transition between dialogical units (to the right in the
figure below), transitions may link non-adjacent units,
• Illocutionary forces (in the center of the figure below:
asserting, disagreeing, rhetorical question, etc.) which
connect: (1) dialogical units and their formal represen-
tation (to the left in the figure) and (2) transitions and
the inferences which may be drawn between formal
representations,
• Inferences between formal representations of dialogi-
cal units. Here again, inferences may occur between
non-adjacent units.
Example (1) can be graphically represented as in Fig. 1.
Though speech act theory introduces the notion of illocu-
tionary force, its models do not allow the representation
of some communicative intentions characteristic for the
MM2012 corpus. According to, for example, Searle and
Vanderveken (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985)’s model, the
utterances in (1-b) could be represented as having question-
ing force. But this would not allow us to express the relation
of support between the propositional contents of those ut-
terances. One could claim that the utterances have in fact an
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LJ said, It was a 
ghastly 
aberration
CL said, Or was 
it in fact typical?
It was a ghastly 
aberration assertinginst. #1
rhet.quest.
inst. #1
It was in fact 
typical
disagreeing
inst. #1
transition 
inst. #1
conflict
inst. #1
CL said, Was it 
product of an 
unsustainable 
policy?
assert.quest.
inst. #2
It was product of 
unsustainable 
policy 
arguing
inst. #1 transition inst. #2rule applic.
inst. #1
Figure 1: Illocutionary structures and argumentation ac-
cording to IAT.
(indirect) assertive force, for the interrogative form of ques-
tion is only the superficial grammatical surface.2 But then a
further problem appears: why the participants of The Moral
Maze programme so often convey their opinions using the
interrogative form instead of the straightforward indicative
form?
The advantages of using questions to convey one’s opin-
ions are twofold: first the speaker has a weaker burden of
proof, i.e. he can more easily withdraw when challenged,
instead of being obliged to defend his standpoint: “I didn’t
claim it, I was only asking”. And second – he can also seek
agreement with the other party, which is the main goal in
such a type of dialogues. That is, the speaker not only con-
veys his beliefs, but also, in using the interrogative form,
he expresses the desire of knowing whether the other party
believes the same, and as a result – agrees with him.
The annotation scheme used in switchboard dialog act cor-
pus, SwDA, in contrast, introduces a category of rhetorical
questions, e.g. “Who would steal a newspaper?”, which
are grammatically formed as questions but are used to con-
vey opinions. Yet they have in fact only assertive illocu-
tion, because (by definition) they do not invite the hearer’s
response. As a result, they cannot fulfil the agreement-
seeking function, since if the hearer is not allowed to re-
spond, he cannot express whether he agrees or disagrees
with the propositional content of the (rhetorical) question.
In particular, if we understood (1-b) as a series of two
rhetorical questions, then James would not be invited to
respond and express his agreement or disagreement with
the thesis that the British behaviour was the product of an
unsustainable policy (while in fact in the next move James
disagrees by saying: “It is the product of a policy conceived
in – by the Cabinet, in the context of the Cold War, when (...)
the British Government is in a near state of funk about what
will happen in their Empire”).
2In this model, the exact representation of (1-b) would be:
argue(Uncivilised behaviour was typical for the Empire); as-
sert(Such a behaviour was the product of an unsustainable pol-
icy).
What we need is to be able to identify the assertive inten-
tions behind such questions. Only then can we assemble the
parts of the argument and attempt to model their composi-
tion into large structures. As far as we are aware, there is no
model which would allow the representation of such double
(asserting and questioning) function of utterances. Thus, as
a general goal we need to identify what types of text units
(unitary illocutionary structures) are characteristic for the
MM2012 corpus and then develop a comprehensive list of
these types.
The second challenge for establishing a reliable foundation
for illocutionary structure parsing is to build a model in
which both units and relations between units can be ex-
pressed. Argumentation is intrinsically relational (it con-
stitutes a relation between premises and a conclusion) what
was recognised by the relation-based approaches such as
Rhetorical Structure Theory, RST and Segmented Dis-
course Representation Theory, SDRT. Yet the identification
of argumentative illocution itself, especially in the dialog-
ical context, can be substantially enhanced if we are also
able to identify the types of units which are at the same
time performed by the individual speakers.
Consider another example from the MM2012 corpus, in
which disputants are talking about the morality of money
and consider whether self-destructive and anti-social be-
haviours (such as getting into debt or going bankrupt) are
(or should be) stigmatised:
(2) a. Michael Portillo: (...) Why be so worried about
restoring stigma?
b. Simon Rose: Well, what I don’t want to see is
a return necessarily to debtors’ prison.
Intuitively, this dialogue contains argumentation with the
conclusion “I am worried about restoring stigma” and the
premise “I don’t want to see a return to debtors’ prison”.
Using RST, we could identify a JUSTIFICATION relation
between the conclusion, which constitutes the nucleus of
the relation, and the premise, which constitutes its satellite.
According to SDRT, on the other hand, Rose performs a
speech act: argue(I am worried about restoring stigma; I
dont want to see is a return necessarily to debtors’ prison),
where the second sentence is the premise of the argument
and at the same time - a dialogical context (history) of the
conclusion.
But what are the cues which allow us to recognise that Rose
is performing argumentation here (apart from the direct in-
terpretation of the analyst about what constitutes an argu-
mentative illocution)? Observe that a specific sequence of
speakers’ individual moves signals that Rose performed ar-
gumentation. More specifically, because (2-b) is a response
to Portillo’s challenge in (2-a), we can interpret this ut-
terance not only as an assertion, but also as an argument
supporting the sentence which was challenged. In other
words, if we did not know what happened in the dialogue
before (2-b), we could still interpret Rose’s utterance as an
assertion (conveying that he is worried about restoring to
debtors’ prison), but we would not be justified in interpret-
ing it as argumentation (especially since we would not even
know what the supported conclusion is without knowing
what Portillo uttered).
919
Thus, the recognition of the (relational) argumentative
force of the relation between (2-a) and (2-b) can be en-
hanced, if we additionally represent that Rose performed
an assertion (a type of unit) as a response to the opponent’s
challenge (also a type of unit). Representing types of both
units and relations is, however, not supported by existing
approaches, due largely to their differing research focus. In
the next section, we show how to extend and enrich the list
of the types of units typical for the MM2012 corpus, and
then we will show how this taxonomy can be combined
with the types of relations (especially argumentative rela-
tion) in a single coherent model.
3. Construction of a corpus
3.1. Description of data
The analysis has been realized from a corpus composed of
three transcripts from the BBC Radio 4 program The Moral
Maze. Each transcript is a debate on controversial issues
and contains a large diversity of argumentation situations.
These debates typically involve a moderator, a panel of four
persons and several witnesses. The MM2012 corpus com-
prises a variety of characteristics that make it relevant for
the task at stake: several types of statements, varying sen-
tences lengths, discourse regulators for managing the di-
alogue etc. The high quality of language, both accurate
and explicit, allows for a clear definition of the speakers’
positions. The total corpus contains 15200 words; it has
342 dialogue structures in 101 turns. We noted 124 ques-
tions or challenges for about 300 assertions, which is rela-
tively well balanced. Discourse regulators, meant to man-
age the overall discussion, occur on average every 15 units,
which shows the vitality of the discussions and the diversity
of the sub-topics addressed. Obviously, more deteriorated
forms of dialogue must also be considered to design a sys-
tem usable in a number of contexts. We however believe
that it is important to have first a very relevant linguistic
model, realized from prototypical dialogues, before mov-
ing on to more deteriorated situations, where mechanisms
dealing with flexibility need to be implemented on top of
our model.
(1) and also (2) are examples of dialogues found in the
MM2012 corpus:
3.2. Agreement Study
The corpus has been annotated (segmentation into dia-
logue and argumentative units, illocutionary forces, transi-
tions, inferences and conflicts) by two annotators separately
which have the same linguistic training and a good exper-
tise of the IAT theoretical background. They then discussed
their analyses in order to produce a single, stable analysis
they both agree with, on which evaluations can be carried
out for the language processing part described in the section
that follows. The analyses, made in OVA+ 3, are available
in the AIFdb Corpora4. OVA (Online Visualisation of Ar-
gument) is an interface for the analysis of arguments online
3http://ova.computing.dundee.ac.uk/plus
4http://www.arg.dundee.ac.uk/aif-corpora/
which allows for a graphical representation of the argumen-
tative structure of a text. The annotators were asked to no-
tify the problems they came across when analysing as well
as during their discussions: this helped understanding the
difficulties and enhancing the model. The ultimate goal at
this level is to design a guide for future annotators.
Obviously, consensus was not easy to reach, but disagree-
ments situations were mostly due to relatively complex
structures in syntax. Results of the Kappa test, calculated
before discussion and summarized in table 1, are better than
for general discourse annotation. The lower results concern
the annotation of rules of inference (0.75) and the transi-
tions (0.77), but it has to be acknowledged that some of
the fragments showed a very tricky structure in terms of ar-
gumentation. For the annotation of indexical illocutionary
forces, the Kappa test result is of 0.78. Since indexical il-
locutionary forces are directly linked to transitions and in-
ferences, these results are not surprising. The agreement
rate for conflicts, less frequent than inferences, is 0.8; and
the one for segmentation is 0.81; the differences of segmen-
tation, however, are mostly due to the fact that one of the
annotators seldom made the conjunctions of coordination
appear in her segmentation of the utterances; nevertheless,
the two annotators always agreed upon the argumentative
units. Eventually, the agreement rate for the attribution of
illocutionary forces to each unit reaches 0.9. This result
shows that the schemes of illocutionary forces can be con-
sidered as stable, easy to identify and accurate.
Types of annotations Kappa results
segmentation 0.81
illocutionary forces (YA) 0.9
indexical illocutionary forces 0.78
conflict relation (CA) 0.8
inference relation (RA) 0.75
rules of dialogue (TA) 0.77
Table 1: Results of the Kappa test
4. A corpus for illocutionary structure
analysis
The next sections briefly describe the linguistic modelling
and the implementation of some of the foundational aspects
of illocutionary force analysis presented above. We will
show how (1) a dialogue can be decomposed into meaning-
ful dialogue text units using a dedicated grammar than can
identify and delimit such units and (2) how an illocutionary
force can be assigned to each of these units, following the
definitions given in Section 5. The analysis has been real-
ized from a development corpus and tested on a different
corpus of the same origin.
The analysis work is based on the MM2012 corpus which is
a series of discussions held by, in total, 12 different partic-
ipants on controversial issues that contain a large diversity
of dialogue and argumentation situations covering all the
types presented below (Table 3) in which the transcript in-
volves punctuation but no prosodic marks; some very long
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sentences; several types of statements; and discourse regu-
lators and other forms of dialogue management.
The language is quite explicit and speaker positions are
made clear in terms of e.g. beliefs, strength of position or
of assumptions. Therefore, we consider this corpus to be
valid and relevant for the task at stake.
Both corpora (development and test) have been manu-
ally annotated with discussion between two annotators to
reach a consensus. Annotating discourse and argumenta-
tion structures is not an easy task compared e.g. to part of
speech annotation tasks.
The global characteristics for our two corpora development
(dev) and test is described in Table 2, and the distribution
of the different illocutionary forces, manually annotated,
found in these two corpora is summarised in Table 3. This
provides us with a picture of the frequency of each type
of illocutionary force. The chart shows the prominence of
standard assertions (noted as A) over the other types: 124
questions (pure, rhetorical or assertive) have been identi-
fied as opposed to about 300 assertions, which is relatively
well balanced. Assertions are differentiated regarding the
strength of the proposition (A+ or A-) and the strength of
the speaker’s position (+A and -A). Cn and PCn respec-
tively stand for concession and popular concession. Dis-
course regulators (DR), meant to manage the overall dis-
cussion, occur on average every 15 assertion or question
discourse units, which shows the vitality of the discussions
and the diversity of the sub-topics addressed. These fig-
ures are also useful to manage priority identification in the
implementation.
Corpus size annotated
(words) structures turns
dev 15200 342 101
test 9000 179 169
Table 2: Corpus characteristics
Illocutionary force Frequency
PQ 36
AQ 52
RQ 36
ACh 2
PCh 5
DR 27
A 280
+A 9
-A 8
A+ 14
A- 6
Cn 1
PCn 8
Table 3: Illocutionary forces distribution
Bob said,
p
Wilma said, 
Why p?
Bob said, 
q
p asserting
inst. #1
challenging
inst. #1
asserting
inst. #2q
arguing
inst. #1 transition 
inst. #2
transition 
inst. #1
rule applic.
inst. #1
Figure 2: IAT
MP said, Why 
be so worried 
about stigma?
SR said, I don't 
want a return to 
debtors' prison
SR is worried 
about restoring 
stigma
challenging
inst. #1
asserting
inst. #1
SR doesn't want 
a return to 
debtors' prison
arguing
inst. #1
transition 
inst. #1
rule applic.
inst. #1
Figure 3: Arguing
5. A grammar for text unit identification
Given a dialogue transcript, the first task is, for each dia-
logue turn, to identify the basic dialogue units. These basic
units are the minimal units, in terms of contents, which are
autonomous and can be connected to other units via vari-
ous types of dialogue relations. Our analysis posits that in
a coherent argumentative text, these units are all linked to
each other, and form a graph, as shown in Figs. 2 – 3.
No unit is left pending: all units are connected to others.
The structure is however not as hierarchical as discourse
analysis in general, and there is no a priori notion of kernel
and satellite.
For that purpose, we developed a specific elementary dis-
course unit (EDU) analysis dedicated to dialogical situa-
tions. These specific EDUs turn out to have specific forms
and linguistic marks proper to argumentative dialogue com-
pared to those defined for discourse analysis in general. Ac-
cording to the observations made on our corpus, in most
situations, units can be identified on the basis of discourse
marks typical of dialogue, e.g. marks related to challenge,
position or belief statements, or an aggregation of such
marks, e.g. when there is an intention of persuasion. A
number of psycholinguistic investigations summarized in
(Grosz and Sidner, 1986) show that marks are used by
human subjects both as cohesive links between adjacent
clauses and as connectors between larger textual units. An
important result is that discourse markers are used consis-
tently with the semantics and pragmatics of the textual units
they connect and they are relatively frequent and unambigu-
ous. These marks can be used for several purposes such as
921
EDU delimitation, characterization and identification of re-
lations between units. The semantics and pragmatics of a
number of connectors are investigated in e.g. (Winterstein,
2012).
A grammar that allows for the identification and the delim-
itation of these text units can be elaborated on the basis of
these marks. Identification and delimitation are two differ-
ent parameters which share a lot of lexical features. It is
not possible at our stage to include intonation or prosodic
indications, however punctuation, considered here, partly
reflects these parameters.
The main categories of marks used to identify text units
include:
• verbs, which promote controversies, beliefs, position
statement and argumentation. The following classes
are the most prominent: propositional attitude verbs
(think, believe, agree, deny), epistemic verbs (know,
understand), communication and report verbs (claim,
hold) and psychological verbs (dream, worry, be in-
trigued); we also noted a few metaphorical uses (it
tends to);
• modal expressions specific to interaction (could be,
may mean);
• opinion expression adverbials and related expressions
(definitely, surely, obviously) found in assertive state-
ments;
• specific interrogative forms, rhetorical questions, or
marks suggesting challenges (where does + pronoun,
isn’t + demonstrative, why should).
Unit delimiters include the above verbs and modal cate-
gories when they are in an initial position of a proposition
(e.g. I think, it seems to, where does), connectors (but, be-
cause), conditional and goal expressions and punctuation
(essentially commas, question marks and dots).
In terms of lexical resource development, these marks cor-
respond to relatively stable lexical categories. Our main
contribution lies at this level in the categorization of the
two last items above which are proper to argumentative di-
alogues.
To handle these marks and their associated linguistic
elements (e.g. subjects, pronouns, negation, modals, etc.)
and morphological variations, we developed ’local’ gram-
mars dealing with e.g. propositional attitude expressions,
position statements, psychological expressions, questions,
etc. in their linguistic diversity. A total of 52 rules have
been developed for that purpose. These rules implement
what we call g-marks (grammaticalized marks), e.g.
informally:
g-mark(Type) --> pronoun,
opt(negation), verb(Type).
where negation is optional and Type is the category of the
verb, e.g. prop-attitude.
These rules were designed manually and emerged from
corpus observations, leading to the above categorizations,
and to generalizations (e.g. including all the relevant
propositional attitude verbs in the lexicon even if only
a few have been observed) in order to have an adequate
linguistic coverage.
These local grammars are then integrated into larger
grammatical forms which both identify and delimit the text
units. The general form of these rules in Dislog syntax is
roughly as follows:
unit identifier -->
unit delimiter, gap, (g-mark, gap)*,
unit delimiter.
where (g-mark,gap)* indicates a sequence of one or more
g-marks, a g-mark being a call to a grammaticalized mark.
The symbol gap indicates a finite set of words which are of
no present interest and which can be skipped. For example,
in:
well, isn’t that a source of injustice?, the first unit delimiter
is the beginning of the sentence, the g-mark is isn’t
that and the second unit delimiter is the question mark.
The two gaps are respectively: well, and a source
of injustice.
The grammar is implemented using the <TextCoop> plat-
form and the Dislog language (Saint-Dizier, 2012), specifi-
cally designed for discourse processing. Dislog extends and
generalizes the expressive power of regular expressions in
several ways, most notably via the introduction of typed
feature structures, controls over skipped structures (gaps)
and its ability to include reasoning schemas, e.g. to resolve
ambiguities or to compute a result. In general, the result of
an analysis is an XML tagged text; it can also be a depen-
dency structure.
We have conducted an indicative evaluation (to identify im-
provement directions) on the previously manually anno-
tated test text where 179 text unit occurrences have been
identified. This is a small scale test but it turns out to be
sufficient for a preliminary analysis. Out of this set of 179
units, our system :
• (i) correctly annotated 153 units (85%) (identification
and delimitation);
• (ii) failed to identify 6 units (4%) because of a lack of
mark;
• (iii) correctly identified 13 units (7%) but with incor-
rect delimitation (a unit is split into several or vice-
versa);
• (iv) identified 7 units (4%) which are not directly dia-
logical text units.
These results are surprisingly good. One reason is proba-
bly that the language in our corpora is a rather good En-
glish, where speakers make sure they can be understood
by their listeners. The discussion is essentially “rational”,
forms of irony, dramatization or trickery are quite unusual.
Another reason is that an adequate organization of an ar-
gumentative dialogue requires that statements, questions,
challenges, etc. are made as clear as possible so that the ar-
gumentation can lead to a conclusion, or a set of weighted
conclusions. Nevertheless, the results are very encouraging
and lay out a promising platform for further research.
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6. Illocutionary structure identification
The next step is to identify for each text unit the illocu-
tionary structures and the illocutionary forces presented in
section 5. A coherent dialogue requires that each text unit is
assigned a type. Unlike at the previous step, it is not possi-
ble, however, to identify all illocutionary force types solely
on the basis of linguistic marks. In some cases the illocu-
tionary force cannot be assigned to a unit in isolation: it is
necessary to take into account e.g. the illocutionary forces
assigned to adjacent units, the position of the unit in the di-
alogue turn (starting, ending) and the role of the speaker in
the debate (e.g. moderator).
Linguistic marks alone do, however, provide substantial in-
formation about illocutionary structure and force. In this
preliminary analysis, we present results obtained on that
basis. Some of these marks may be common to unit delim-
itation, in particular verbs. Their semantics and syntactic
behavior explain these multiple roles in our linguistic de-
scription. Similarly as above, these linguistic forms have
been identified from our corpus, and then expanded to sim-
ilar terms and represented as above for text units by means
of g-marks.
A significant number of linguistic forms we have identi-
fied are very general and are shared by several illocution-
ary forces. Our strategy is not to have default illocution-
ary force assignment, but to represent the ambiguity, which
may be resolved later by other means, including inferences,
which can be introduced in Dislog rules. For that purpose,
we introduced polymorphic types to represent the ambi-
guity (or underspecification). For example, AQ-RQ is the
polymorphic type assigned to a text unit which can be one
of the two types AQ or RQ, when it was not possible to
make a decision between these two types. Of interest is the
study of the overlap situations, so that the pragmatic factors
at stake can be better identified. Polymorphic types concern
questions or assertions separately, since these two main cat-
egories have different functions and can be relatively well
identified via punctuation.
Our corpus analysis shows that linguistic forms associated
with illocutionary force identification are quite diverse (42
forms have been identified), with a large number of mor-
phological variants. 12 types, simple or polymorphic, have
been defined for questions. Forms which are common to
two or more basic types are included into specific rules and
directly assign the relevant polymorphic type.
From our analysis, it turns out that about 63% of the lin-
guistic marks are typical of a unique illocutionary force,
therefore proper to specific types. We have, for example
the following types of marks:
- RQ: conditional questioning (why should, should we), and
indirect forms based on negation (aren’t, isn’t);
- AQ: important use of the past (was it, were we), and forms
using would (would you, would that);
- ACh: why followed by the auxiliary to be;
- PCh: why followed by do or would;
- Polymorphic types such as PCh-RQ include forms which
are ambiguous, in particular why + (do) + demonstrative;
- RQ-PQ includes forms in should + demonstrative or per-
sonal pronoun.
To identify illocutionary forces we have then written 18
rules that integrate the above systems of marks (as g-marks)
in Dislog that implement the recognition of illocutionary
forces. This modest number of rules allows a good man-
agement of concurrency between rules.
Considering our corpus of three manually annotated texts,
we have the following distributions for polymorphic types:
- PQ-AQ: 13%,
- AQ-RQ: 10%,
- RQ-PCh: 4%,
- RQ-ACh: 4%,
- and 3% for the remainder.
This means that about 62% of the text units are a priori un-
ambiguous w.r.t. their illocutionary force, which is a rather
low proportion. It is thus crucial to identify additional fac-
tors (pragmatic, typographic) that contribute to resolve the
ambiguities.
If, finally, we consider the 153 text units that were correctly
identified, as indicated in the previous section, we obtain
the results given in Table 4. In the first case, the assignment
is made for the basic type of illocutionary forces, so there
is no ambiguity. In the second case, it is important to note
that 65% of the polymorphic types is the combination of
different strengths of assertions where the distinction, even
for humans, is difficult to make. The erroneous assignment
can still be improved by some typographic and linguistic
adjustments. These results – of 78% accuracy with poly-
morphic types – although still preliminary, are very encour-
aging considering the difficulty of the task.
correctly via basic types 38%
correctly via polymorphic types 40%
erroneously 22%
Table 4: Assignment of the illocutionary forces.
The results of the parse are annotations over the original
text, as shown for example (1):
<utterance speaker = ”lj” illoc = ”standard assertion”><textunit
nb = ”215”> it was a ghastly aberration < /textunit> .
<utterance speaker = ”cl” illoc = ”RQ”> <textunit nb = ”216”>
or was it in fact typical ? < /textunit> < /utterance> .
<utterance speaker = ”cl” illoc = ”RQ-AQ”> <textunit nb =
”217”> was it the product of a policy that was unsustainable that
could only be pursued by increasing repression? < /textunit> .
6.1. Towards a model for Transitions and
argumentation analysis
Dialogue transitions are elaborated on the basis of illocu-
tionary forces, then the type of argumentation can be in-
duced from these transitions. This task is ongoing. For
example, the dialogue pattern:
pure question(Speaker1)→ Affirmation(Speaker2)→ As-
sertion(Speaker2).
can be interpreted as an agreement, a reframing or a support
of speaker2 to speaker1’s question.
In a large number of cases, to properly identify transitions,
it is necessary (1) to introduce knowledge and pragamtic
factors and (2) to consider quite a large frame that in-
cludes several illocutionary forces for each speaker since
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dialogues have a relatively complex structure and relevant
transition identifiers may not be adjacent. This introduces
additional complexity and risks of ambiguity. Dislog rules
allow the introduction of knowledge and reasoning which
may enable the system to improve transition identification.
7. Conclusions
Using the general framework of Inference Anchoring The-
ory, the paper proposes a simple taxonomy of unitary illo-
cutionary structures that accompany argumentation in di-
alogical contexts in the MM2012 corpus, and reports pre-
liminary results for recognition of those illocutionary struc-
tures in raw, spoken-language transcripts. These results
are encouraging and bring the automatic identification of
dialogic argument structure in discourse such as the real-
world, complex examples ?? and (1) one step closer, with
the parse above representing a crucial milestone.
This is a first experiment in illocutionary structure parsing
that needs to be further extended to other texts of the same
type (agreement-seeking dialogues on controversial issues),
so that the linguistic model can be enhanced. Results so far
are relatively good, though more deteriorated forms of di-
alogues will also be considered, where irony and emphasis
may present additional challenges.
Then, we will need to develop the last two steps shown in
Figs. 2 – 3, namely the representation and implementation
of relational illocutionary structures and transition types
specific for agreement-seeking dialogues. In particular, we
expect that besides argumentative illocutionary structures,
the participants could have explanatory intentions (which
will introduce inferences as well), and disagreeing and un-
dercutting intentions (which will introduce the relation of
conflict between propositional contents). In terms of tran-
sitions typical for the MM2012 corpus, we expect to en-
counter sequences of PCh-A which will anchor argumen-
tative illocutions and inferences, but also, e.g. sequences
of AQ-A which will anchor illocution of disagreement and
conflict. Together, these techniques can pave the way to-
wards recognition of the structure of the argumentative di-
alogue as a whole.
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